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Introduction 
Historically, regionalisation has sought to ease the tension between ethno-territorial interests 
and the central state, while during the post-war decades the emphasis has been increasingly on 
both strengthening regional development in response to globalisation of the economy and 
creating efficient political-administrative units capable of providing those public services that 
require a large population base, such as specialist medical care (Tomblin, 2007; Prytherch, 
2009; Page, 1991).  
Regionalisation has generally been strongly opposed by local actors fearing to lose control of 
local affairs. Such opposition has been manifested in most of the major territorial reform cases 
in Europe (Page, 1991; Bukowski, 2000; Blomqvist and Bergman, 2010; Chorianopoulos, 
2012; Hartwich, 2013; OECD, 2014). In this field a bottom-up approach to regionalisation is 
unique in that it gives local actors a decisive role in territorial reform, as has been the case in 
Finland, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands (OECD, 2014). Here we probe this issue 
through the case of Finland.   
Finland serves as an example through which to understand the impact of localism on 
territorial policy. First, it is a decentralised unitary state where local government is highly 
influential. Second, Finland’s regional government structure has historically been weak, 
without democratic functions and responsibility for welfare services. These have been 
addressed through an evolutionary development of complex collaborative arrangements 
between local authorities, sometimes referred to as second-tier local government. The only 
case exemplifying genuine ethno-territorial interests in Finland is the autonomous Swedish-
speaking region of the Åland Islands, enjoying special arrangements affirmed in 1921 by the 
League of Nations (see Malloy, 2013). Third, a crucial dynamic aspect is that since the early 
1990s Finland has experienced an unprecedented regionalisation wave, resulting in tensional 
reforms including top-down, negotiated and bottom-up processes. Taken together, these 
factors constitute a unique real-world case for studying the impact of localism on the local and 
regional government reform, which is actually rarely discussed in the academic literature. 
The literature on Finnish public sector reforms includes analyses of various aspects of 
national reform of regional structure (e.g. Mennola, 1999; Lähteenmäki-Smith, 2006; Haveri, 
2006; Kettunen, 2009; Kull, 2009; Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2011; Haveri et al., 2015) and of 
its connections with Nordic and European developments (Hörnström, 2010; 2013; Lind, 2013; 
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Kettunen and Kungla, 2005). Considering more comprehensively the body of literature on 
local government and governance reforms in Finland, numerous publications are in some way 
relevant to the topic of this article. This includes analyses of reform processes and evaluations 
of individual reform programmes, although for obvious reasons few are available in English 
(e.g. Nyholm, 2008; Airaksinen, 2009; Airaksinen and Haveri, 2012; Meklin and Pekola-
Sjöblom, 2013). Nevertheless, we look at this issue from the point of view of localism, for 
according to public debate, this is decisive in torpedoing or reshaping territorial reforms. Only 
few academic works discuss localism in Finland (e.g. Andersson and Sjöblom, 2013) and, 
according to our review, none of these focuses on its impact on regionalisation. 
 This article aims to shed light on the role of localism in territorial reforms in Finland, a 
Nordic country with a strong localist tradition built into the post-war development of the 
welfare society. We will focus on three questions:  
(i) What has been the impact of localism on the Finnish local and regional government reform
agenda in the post-war era? 
(ii) To what extent has localism de facto affected the reshaping of regional structure since the
introduction of territorial reforms from the early 1990s onwards? 
(iii) What explains the radical turn in territorial reform agenda in 2015 evidenced by Prime
Minister Juha Sipilä’s centre-right government’s decision to establish an elected regional 
government? 
Methodologically, we conduct institutional analysis of the case of Finland (Yin, 2008). Even 
if such an analysis is based on the context-specific features of the case, it also sheds light on 
territorial policy reforms in general by enhancing the understanding of the institutional 
dynamics of such processes, most notably of the impact of localism and of the persistent 
institutional trajectory and related critical junctures (see Amenta, 2009). In the empirical 
analysis we focus on path dependence and critical junctures of the territorial reform process 
and related discourses, drawing empirical data from preparatory legislative materials, 
evaluation reports and policy documents. The framework for our analysis will be discussed in 
the next section. 
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Theoretical and methodological framework  
 
Key underpinnings of institutional analysis 
 
Our approach is rooted in the historical institutional approach to public policy making (see 
Mahoney, 2000; Amenta and Ramsey, 2010). Institutionalists generally explore how 
institutions are created and how they structure human behaviour. Historical institutionalists 
approach this issue by paying particular attention to continuity and change (see Steinmo, 
2008). The historical aspect of our analysis concerns not when something happens in a 
sequence of events but rather the dynamics of public sector reform. Such a perspective goes 
beyond ‘constant causes’ or renegotiations without drastic change (Thelen, 2003) by 
acknowledging that the dynamics of institutional change occasionally produces outcomes that 
are “the accumulated responses to particular stimuli or other dynamic changes” (Lieberman, 
2001). 
 
We discuss a process in which institutional interventions by central government create the 
preconditions for governmentality, which includes the strategies by which the state tries to 
render local and regional levels governable (cf. Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Shand, 2015). 
The other side of the coin is how local governments affect the structural reforms conditioning 
their own functioning. The setting is thus institutionally mediated and layered. Moreover, 
rather than institutional regularities, we look for patterns of change, i.e. resistance to change, 
power to shape reform discourses, and the point at which key actors begin to favour change 
over the status quo (see Gains et al., 2005). 
 
A standard category of institutional analysis is path dependence. This refers to sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, which in the public policy context implies a fixed political 
or bureaucratic mindset and stickiness of institutional structures. It helps to pay attention to 
lock-ins and the difficulty of escaping the given institutional trajectory (Henning et al., 2013). 
It refers to both irreversible and self-reinforcing processes, implying potential incremental 
changes as necessary adjustments to enable the required functions at the given trajectory 
without undermining the structural features of the institutional entity, even if it may 
eventually become suboptimal (Thelen, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Interestingly, such 
self-perpetuating sequences are used by local governments to influence their own political-
institutional context, thus, ultimately determining their ability to maintain the status quo. 
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Periodisation, another standard tool in historical institutional analysis, serves primarily as a 
characterisation of a particular transitional period shaped by subtle markers and changes in the 
spirit of territorial reform (see Lieberman, 2001). Identification of critical junctures has a 
crucial role in such an analysis. Such junctures refer to periods when actors are briefly faced 
with a wider range of feasible options having a significant impact on subsequent outcomes 
(Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). As we will later show, our case itself implies that, beside 
major exogenous events such as electoral landslides and radical reforms, we need to pay 
attention to incremental changes or micro-junctures as a part of the transformation process 
(Shand, 2015; Thelen, 2003). 
 
Such methodological underpinnings of historical institutionalism enable us to frame our 
empirical observations and the reading of policy documents. Such an explanatory scheme 
creates a narrative causal account (cf. Griffin, 1992; Lieberman, 2001) where the nature of 
causation is essentially historical and conjunctural (Amenta, 2009).  
 
Influence of localist forces 
 
Our conceptualisation of the influence of local governments and their associations as 
representatives of modern localism is derived from the discussion of interest group influence 
(Pedersen, 2013). It asserts that the direction of lobbying (pro-status quo vs. anti-status quo) 
and the stage of the policy cycle have a great methodological importance (Pritoni, 2014). To 
identify causalities, we may contrast the goals of an individual reform programme with the 
actual results, assess the degree of goal attainment, and consider whether the degree of failure 
was due to by accidents, technical reasons or structural or political factors. This setting 
implies in general that the more radical change achieved through the reform, the greater the 
loss to pro-status quo groups. Pritoni’s (2014) typology of influence in policy process 
identifies three forms for pro-status quo groups: veto, negotiation and boycott. To prevent the 
change an interest group may use veto in agenda setting to make the reform as moderate as 
possible, or even attempt to avoid politicising the issue in the first place; negotiate its terms 
by filibustering or bargaining in the decision-making process; and boycott the implementation 
by various means.  
 
Methodologically, a particularly challenging issue is to identify the major reasons for 
maintaining the status quo, which may have been other than hypothesised in our analysis. 
Even if in such complex social processes causalities are interdependent, the representatives of 
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local governments and their associations stand out as major players in the national reform 
discourse. Recent evaluations of municipal and regional reforms in Finland concur with this 
observation (Haveri, 2006; Nyholm, 2008; Airaksinen, 2009; Kettunen, 2009; Meklin and 
Pekola-Sjöblom, 2013; Haveri et al., 2015). Moreover, our case has a methodological 
advantage in this respect, as the measurement of interest representation and lobbying is easier 
in the case of pro-status quo groups, in cases where the key political actors have a fairly stable 
position and where the time span is fairly short (Pritoni, 2014).  
 
Reform discourse, agency and institutions 
 
A distinctive feature of our analysis is the interest in the policy discourse around 
regionalisation. As contended by Phillips and others (2004, p. 635), “institutions are 
constituted through discourse and --- it is not action per se that provides the basis for 
institutionalization but, rather, the texts that describe and communicate those actions.” In 
addition, institutions seek to legitimise their own interests and existence through discourses 
through which they seek to preserve, transform or reconceptualise social practices (Mayr, 
2008). On the other hand, discourses are potentially much more irrational, dynamic and 
ambiguous than posited by ‘old’ institutionalisms (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). 
 
Discourses as processes are about political communication and policy construction. Our 
interest is in the policy sphere, where “the coordinative discourse consists of the individuals 
and groups at the center of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, 
and justification of policy and programmatic ideas” (Schmidt, 2008). What, then, determines 
the success of the representation and process of a discourse in exerting causal influence by 
promoting change? According to Schmidt (2008), it is the articulation of the substantive 
content, such as relevance, adequacy, applicability, and appropriateness. Besides substantive 
content of discourse, however, we need to consider the related interactive processes within 
which agents convey their ideas (see Van Dijk, 1997). When applied to the assessment of the 
success or failure of a policy, it implies that what matters is not only policy viability but also 
administrative and political viability (Kingdon, 1984). 
 
Process-wise, it is important to convince others of the necessity or appropriateness of a given 
course of action. In compound polities, where governing activities tend to be dispersed among 
multiple authorities, as in Nordic unitary states with proportional representation and 
corporatist structures, the coordinative discourse among policy actors tends to be much more 
7 
elaborate than the communicative discourse to the public (Schmidt, 2008). This view 
substantiates the ideas presented earlier on historical institutionalism by highlighting the 
special nature of discourses in policy-making context. 
 
Localism and regionalisation tendencies: from conflict to integration 
 
Institutionally, localism builds on the premise that the territorial organisation of society 
should be based on large number of relatively small governments wielding power in issues 
such as land use regulation, local taxation and public service provision. Regionalisation 
usually conflicts such a premise in that it transfers some power to regional government with a 
larger territorial scope and population base. From a localist perspective it is a step towards 
centralisation (Briffault, 1999). However, the factual developments of intermediary-level 
political-administrative units may vary considerably, for they can be based on decentralisation 
of central responsibilities, as seen in continental Europe and the UK, or an aggregation of 
municipal responsibilities, as in the Nordic countries (Blomqvist and Bergman, 2010; 
Bertrana and Heinelt, 2013).  
 
Current developments in regionalisation reflect a transition from traditional regional policy 
based on redistribution and state steering towards a new regionalist perspective (Hörnström, 
2013; see e.g. Barnes and Foster, 2012). Such a paradigm shift implies changes in the local-
regional interface: regional governance structures are more accessible and responsive to local 
communities than are provincial and national agencies, yet more affordable and effective at 
instigating change than single community efforts (Markey et al., 2005). This evidently 
increases local players’ interest to engage in the bottom-up style regionalisation associated 
with New Localism (Rees and Rose, 2015; Pratchett, 2004).  
 
In spite of the emergent aspects of local-regional interface, incipient regionalisation has often 
been persistently opposed by localist forces. In many cases local authorities fear that under 
regional authorities they would be too strictly controlled - sometimes even more than under 
central government (Bukowski, 2000; Chorianopoulos, 2012), which would violate the 
ingrained ideas of local self-sufficiency and local choice (Moore, 2014; Stewart, 1983). Such 
fears invoke reactionary localism affecting local actors’ orientation towards territorial reforms 
(cf. Howlett, 2003). In the decentralised welfare society such localism is highly 
institutionalised and associated primarily with the opportunity of local political élites and 
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public managers to shape local public services (Stewart, 1983; Page, 1991). This is 
undoubtedly one of the critical points of previously mentioned local-regional interface. 
 
Localism in the Finnish political-administrative system  
 
Local government in Finnish public administration 
 
The Finnish political-administrative system is fairly decentralised; local governments deliver 
most of the welfare services, including health care, social services, basic and secondary 
education, town planning, municipal waste management, libraries, etc. A simplified diagram 
of the system is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Simplified diagram of the current governmental structures in Finland. 
 
Finnish local governments are self-governing entities, protected by the Constitution. They 
have a general competence and decision-making authority in local affairs. Intergovernmental 
relations have evolved towards a kind of contingent relationship between local and central 
government, depending on the size of local authority, the political issue, the policy 
programme and the way the state applies steering mechanisms (Nyholm, 2011).  
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In 2016 there are 313 local authorities in Finland, the average size being only slightly more 
than 17,000 inhabitants (median as low as 6,000 inhabitants). The supreme decision-making 
organ is the municipal council, which is elected by local residents. Local government is 
independent in its decision making, its most important source of revenues being municipal 
taxation levied at flat rates set by the council. About half of all local government expenditures 
are covered by local taxes with state grants of close to one-fifth (on the basics of Finnish local 
government, see www.localfinland.fi).  
 
Roots and forms of localist influence 
 
Historically, localism was prominent in Finland’s nation-building process in the latter half of 
the 19th century, consolidating into the agrarian localism of the first half of the following 
century, and developing further during the post-World War II decades into a nation-wide, 
decentralised welfare system implemented primarily through the modernised local authorities 
and joint local authorities (Andersson and Sjöblom, 2013).  
 
Politically, the Centre Party of Finland has been the core of agrarian politics and a primary 
advocate of local self-government. From the early 1950s until the late 1980s the Centre Party 
held political power in tandem with the Social Democrats and more recently with the 
conservative National Coalition Party. It was instrumental in designing national reforms (on 
party politics and territorial reforms, see e.g. Massetti and Toubeau, 2014).  
 
The other pillar of modern localism is local government. As a provider of local public 
services with a huge share of national GDP and employment, it is a heavyweight player in the 
design and implementation of public sector reforms. The strong influence of local government 
comes from its traditional image as a forum for local democracy, policymaking and 
development. Finland is small country by population without markedly differing regional 
identities, hence justifying an elected regional tier of government has been difficult (the only 
exception being the autonomous region of Åland). As Finnish localism manifests itself 
notably through a representative system of government and the machinery that provides 
public services (see Hildreth, 2011), it is less a reflection of local identity than an expression 
of two freedoms: those of being safeguarded from central government intervention and being 
able to produce locally preferred services and other policy outcomes (cf. Pratchett, 2004).  
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Major routes for local government interventions in territorial policies are illustrated in Figure 
2, with modern localism as a special category between ‘society centred’ and ‘state centred’ 
approaches to policymaking analysis (Meier, 1991).  
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Figure 2. Illustration of routes of localist influence on territorial reforms.  
 
Much of the lobbying in the interests of local governments is done by the Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA), which focuses on general interest 
representation. AFLRA and a few similar organisations influence the territorial reform agenda 
through direct political contacts and media as well as through their involvement in political 
and corporatist arrangements, such as national joint committees appointed by central 
government. 
 
Localism and territorial reforms in Finland 
 
The most important structural reform agenda after the Second World War was the so-called 
the Great Municipal Reform promoted by several successive governments since the early 
1960s. It lasted some twenty years but achieved no notable territorial reform. It is significant 
that the strong hold maintained on local self-government was a decisive argument blocking 
proposed large-scale municipal mergers (Kull, 2009).  
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The next major reform, the Free Municipality Experiment 1989-1996, emulated other Nordic 
countries in allowing bottom-up change, partnerships and streamlining of municipal 
organisations (Baldersheim and Ståhlberg, 1994). A clear indication of the sentiment in the 
early 1990s was the finding of a national committee of enquiry on regional government that 
there was no need for democratic and autonomous regional government in Finland (Kull, 
2009).  
 
A new reform wave started in the 1990s from the need to strengthen regions within a 
European regional development framework. Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 was 
obviously a major event in the process. It necessitated the construction of institutional 
structures to administer European regional policy and EU structural funds in particular. To 
take care of these tasks the joint municipal authorities known as Regional Councils were 
created by merging inter-municipal associations with regional planning associations (there are 
currently 18 Regional Councils in mainland Finland).  
 
This process also brought sub-regions into the picture, i.e. supplementary units of regional 
governance originally created in response to the needs of EU structural policy and its 
statistical requirements (i.e. LAU1 level of the classification of statistical territorial units of 
the EU). Even if collaboration within sub-regions was voluntary, it served as a collaborative 
learning process at the early stage of the institutionalisation of ‘new regions’ (Haveri, 2003). 
The sub-regions were officially abolished in 2014. 
 
The 2000s was essentially the time of sub-regional cooperation, for beside the establishment 
of sub-regions, inter-municipal collaboration proliferated in many service sectors, such as 
municipal waste management. A sign of hard line policy appeared around the same time, as 
the government’s decision on the Fire and Rescue Service Reform eventually resulted in the 
establishment of 22 fire and rescue areas, which became operational in 2002 (Kallio and 
Tolppi, 2012). On top of that, ministries initiated sectoral development projects, such as the 
SEUTU Project (2000-2008) and the Sub-region Project in Education (2003-2004). The 
SEUTU Project was the most important project relating to sub-regionalisation, even though 
its pick-and-mix approach was not particularly successful. It was terminated prematurely and 
formally incorporated into the then on-going Municipal and Service Structure Reform 
(Nyholm, 2008). 
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The first experiment in democratically-elected regional government on Finland’s mainland 
was known as The Regional Government Experiment in Kainuu. The experiment ran from 
2005 to 2012, aiming to ensure access to health care, social services and educational services 
for all residents of a sparsely populated and remote region (Leskinen, 2005). In the Kainuu 
experiment a particular concern was whether a larger regional unit could achieve cost savings 
in service provision. The evaluation report shows that the experiment did indeed achieve cost 
savings with no evidence of this being at the expense of service quality (MoF, 2008; 
Hämäläinen and Moisio, 2011). Adoption of the new regional government model after the 
trial period required unanimous agreement among its constituent municipalities. That 
condition was not met, however, because a single municipality opposed continuation – 
another demonstration of the extreme influence of localism on the Finnish political scene. 
One of the major deficiencies of this model seemed to be that the constituent municipalities 
used their own revenues to jointly cover its costs, making it more similar to a joint municipal 
authority than genuine regional government (Haveri et al., 2015). 
 
All these reforms were mostly separately designed, demonstrating the piecemeal approach to 
the reform of regional structure (cf. Knox, 2002). We will next discuss the most important and 
illustrative reform agenda, Municipal and Service Structure Reform, and the following chain 
of events that led to the framework decision in 2015 to adopt elected regional government 
model nationwide. 
 
Municipal and Service Structure Reform and its aftermath 
 
The Municipal and Service Structure Reform 
 
The Municipal and Service Structure Reform 2005-2011, known in Finland as the PARAS 
Project, set up by PM Matti Vanhanen’s first cabinet aimed to ensure that local authorities had 
a sufficient structural and financial basis on which to provide services. In the cabinet’s report 
to parliament the rationale of the reform was expressed as follows: 
 
 “The Government is to introduce a municipal and service structure reform. Taking 
into account special features of different areas, there is a need to guarantee a 
sufficient population base for services organised by local authorities. The reform will 
create a well-functioning service network and intensify collaboration between 
different service systems. --- Specialist medical services and other services requiring 
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a large population base must be fused population-wise into sufficiently large 
[territorial] entities. (Sisäasiainministeriö, 2005). 
 
This reform agenda included both mergers and inter-municipal cooperation, which were 
needed to form entities covering large functional areas. In its statement on the previously 
mentioned report, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA) 
emphasised that, 
 
“the responsibility for organising the most important basic services will continue to 
be vested in local authorities in the future. Accordingly, it is important that the 
safeguarding of services is approached in a municipality-oriented fashion taking into 
account the functional entity of local government.  Improvement in service efficiency 
cannot be built on the basis of sector-based, compulsory municipal cooperation.” 
(AFLRA, 2005).   
 
During the reform, the number of local authorities was reduced from 444 in 2004 to 336 in 
2012, which was actually quite a significant change given the background of prevailing 
political realities. 
 
The original reform included no policy option for compulsory amalgamations of 
municipalities. However, the situation changed when the Centre Party as the largest party lost 
its leading position to the National Coalition Party in the 2011 parliamentary elections. PM 
Jyrki Katainen’s cabinet (2011-2014) prepared the required legislative amendment and 
implemented a couple of compulsory municipal mergers in 2014. Soon after this unpopular 
move the declining government dropped such a hard-line policy and continued to promote 
voluntary mergers – obviously another indication of the strong localist influence in the 
process.  
 
In 2011 Prime Minister Katainen’s cabinet promised a historically unique ‘Great Municipal 
Reform’, but its ambitious plans to radically reduce the number of local authorities by 
mergers failed. One of the main reasons for this failure was localism, which seemed to have 
extended its tentacles deep into the Finnish political system. As assessed retrospectively by an 
editorial in the major Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat on 28 October 2015, “Local 
authorities aided by the Centre Party in opposition raised a terrible hullabaloo, and the cabinet 
lacked the political courage to implement compulsory mergers. Local government was left in 
peace – or so they thought - and attempts at reform were transferred to social and health care -
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--.” (Helsingin Sanomat, 2015). This quotation crystallises the fate of Katainen’s attempted 
territorial reform. 
 
Establishment of social and health care and regional self-governing areas 
 
The story did not end with the watered-down Municipal and Service Structure Reform. Quite 
the reverse, soon after it was actually time to turn a new page in Finnish territorial reform. 
The first sign of this change was the Social and Health Care Reform, which had been 
discussed for decades but gained impetus after the political pact between the government and 
opposition in March 2014 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2014). The pact remained 
seemingly imprecise, dictating only that the reform would be based on five large social and 
health care areas responsible for organising health and social services. The new Social and 
Health Care Reform was eventually abandoned in March 2015, however, as the Constitutional 
Law Committee found that it violated the democratic rights of citizens.  
 
The consensus achieved on the direction of radical sectoral reform, though unconstitutional, 
proved that decisions on structural changes could actually be taken, which is an important 
sign in a situation in which the status quo had been fiercely protected by localist forces for 
decades. A new script for the forthcoming radical reform was written after the parliamentary 
elections by the new government, Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s centre-right cabinet, in May 
2015. The Strategic Programme of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government states that,  
 
“The Government will prepare a solution for the arrangement of social welfare and 
health care (SOTE) services based on autonomous areas larger than a municipality. 
There will be a maximum of 19 areas.” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). 
 
The government removed the municipal mergers from the agenda and even refrained from 
giving local authorities any new duties or obligations in the government term 2015–2019. The 
diminution of the role of local government in services was stated as follows:  
 
“The Government will promote a change in the role of the municipality of the future, 
from an arranger of services increasingly to a promoter of vitality, entrepreneurship and 
employment in its area.” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). 
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In other words, local authorities would no longer serve as the main vehicle for providing 
welfare services. Institutionally, the focus was on regions:  
 
“The primary solution is to centralize functions in terms of duties and authority in clear 
autonomous areas.” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). 
 
Besides self-governing areas as a new locus of welfare services, the government’s strategic 
policy document highlights new regionalism by emphasising the government’s support for 
metropolitan areas and the capital region in particular in their quest for international 
competitiveness and business development (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). 
 
The pieces of the puzzle began to fall into place in an integrated regional reform agenda. In 
November 2015 the government introduced a new plan for 18 regional self-governing areas 
and 15 social and health care areas (in Finnish sote-alue), which implies that three regional 
entities needed to collaborate with others in providing social and health care services. 
According to preliminary plans, welfare services will be organised by large self-governing 
regional entities with a democratic decision-making structure with the social and health care 
sector at its core, supplemented by various other regional services. From the point of view of 
long-lasting localism this decision is about to change everything, for in the future Finnish 
public administration will be organised at three levels, those of the state, self-governing 
regions and local authorities, the primary tasks being respectively night-watchman functions, 
welfare services and local vitality. The government has a plan to introduce this bill to 
parliament in October 2016, and the new structure is to be fully operational in 2019.  (VN, 
2015b). 
 
What is striking here is the fact that the strategic government programme and the decision on 
territorial reform in November 2015 marked a change that seemingly put an end to the 
dominance of localism on territorial agenda. Retrospectively, it seems that the two decades 
from 1995 to 2015 were a succession of governmental efforts to tame localism. The straw that 
broke the camel’s back was the competitiveness-oriented agenda of the centre-right 
government in the context of the looming financial crisis. The changes were deemed 
necessary and, with the backing of the required majority in parliament, their execution finally 
became politically possible. In terms of political gains, the Centre Party achieved with this 
reform a fairly large number of self-governing regions, which resonates with its rural roots 
and political support in different parts of Finland, whereas the political right got the 
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economies of scale, partial recentralisation of budget control, and prospects for increasing 
consumer choice and competitive bidding in the provision of welfare services. 
 
Discussion 
 
The assertive localism contributed not only to the emergence of various forms of bottom-up 
regionalisation but also had a considerable effect on the top-down reforms. The most dramatic 
examples of the latter are the termination of the Regional Government Experiment in Kainuu 
and the shelved Municipal and Service Structure Reform, both introduced in the mid-2000s. 
 
Although successive governments in the last twenty years have considered local governments 
too small to tackle future challenges, they have been unable to design and implement any 
comprehensive territorial reform. Rather, there has been a piecemeal approach to 
regionalisation, which eventually brought about a messy middle-tier governance field. 
However, the pieces of the puzzle started to form a more integrated local-regional setting 
around 2015, due to the political decision of Sipilä’s centre-right government to introduce 
new regional self-governing areas and social and health care areas. 
 
The rise of new regionalism and its deviation from traditional localism is summarised in 
Table 1. At the risk of oversimplification, the 1980s was the last decade of traditional 
localism and the 2000s saw strong tendencies for both mergers (promoted by the Municipal 
and Service Structure Reform) and a search for a suitable model for regional government (in 
the Regional Government Experiment in Kainuu), the 1990s being a decade of transition. This 
transitional period saw the rise of both regions and sub-regions, essentially within the EU 
framework, which seemed to give an impetus to a stronger regionalisation agenda for the next 
decades. 
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Table 1. Transition from decentralised to regionalised Finnish public administration. 
 
 Modern decentralised system New regionalised system 
Historical period 1960s to the mid-1990s From the mid-1990s onwards 
Underlying ideology Localism New regionalism 
Framing policy Welfare policy; universalism; 
public service expansion 
Competitiveness policy; 
efficiency; austerity 
measures 
Geographical reference 
area 
Local community Functional area 
Basic service area Local authority’s jurisdiction Large municipality / region 
Elected regional 
government 
None (except Åland) Experimented 2005-2012 in 
Kainuu; decision to introduce 
self-governing regions 
(2015) 
 
When analysed within an institutionalist framework, it is obvious that Finland’s EU accession 
was a major event that paved the way for regionalisation. A more decisive milestone was the 
parliamentary elections and the subsequent formation of Sipilä’s centre-right government in 
2015, which eventually led to the downfall of the dominance of localism on the territorial 
policy agenda with the establishment of 18 regional self-governing areas and 15 social and 
health care areas. The micro-junctures during the past twenty years clearly showed the power 
of localist forces, but the contextual pressures and political shift – and especially the Centre 
Party’s inclination to support strong regions and the National Coalition’s stress on economies 
of scale – changed the tone of the coordinative discourse. Besides, the articulation of 
substantive content on the localist side did not sound particularly convincing against the 
widely felt strain and darkening economic outlook. The advantages of localism were 
increasingly judged against fears that without considerable efficiency gains the country would 
face economic disaster. As emphasised by Prime Minister Sipilä in his speech on government 
policy in June 2015, Finland is experiencing simultaneously debt and competitiveness crises, 
and therefore needs both considerable cost savings and major reforms. A Nordic economic 
wunderkind was even in danger of being placed under Brussels’ budget control (VN, 2015a). 
Recent changes in territorial reform must be understood against such sentiment. The localism 
that was blocking a radical reform was thus effectively weakened by a blow to the very core 
of the power of representative localism, i.e. by transferring the main responsibility for 
organising welfare services to new regions.  
 
What explains this paradigm shift? The socio-causation is obviously conjunctural, fusing 
contextual pressures, such as global and European financial crises, high national public debt 
and heightened awareness of the competitiveness challenge, with the electoral victory of 
18 
centre, right-wing and populist parties in April 2015. This made radical institutional layering 
possible (the term refers to partial renegotiation of some elements of a given set of institutions, 
see Thelen, 2003). Within the political system the role of the Centre Party was decisive, as it 
became again the largest party in parliament. Many experts as well as the National Coalition 
as a major right-wing party in the cabinet, favoured larger areas and fewer units in the name 
of economies of scale, but could not sustain this against pressure from the Centre Party to 
keep the number of major regional units fairly large, ultimately reflecting the division of 
historical regions in Finland. Localist forces were neither able to veto the radical 
regionalisation agenda nor to negotiate it effectively against the government’s pursuit of 
radical reform. Hypothetically, their next step would be boycott, which is an unlikely option 
given the Finnish consensual political culture and high level of compliance with norms. 
Rather, ‘old’ localism will most likely be transformed into Nordic-style ‘new localism’ in the 
local-regional interplay. The first sign of this is that AFLRA has already welcomed new 
regions under its umbrella (Kuntalehti, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the provision of public services in Finland has traditionally been assigned to local 
government, globalisation, the EU spatial development discourse, severe constraints on public 
finances and other related developments have prompted Finland to promote regionalisation, 
which, due to the small size of the population of the country and its assertive localism, has 
been pursued without an elected regional government. 
 
Regionalisation in Finland from the early 1990s onwards was asymmetric because it was not 
based on the conventional argument for regional government but evolved as a regionalisation 
of governance legitimised by Finland’s consensus-oriented political culture, strong localist 
sentiment and the prowess of relatively well-resourced multi-purpose local authorities and 
their associations. However, after the formation of the centre-right government in 2015, the 
time was ripe for a decisive reform of regional structure, which is currently under way. It is 
still vigorously debated, and the actual organisational and financial arrangements are still to a 
large extent unknown, but the tide seems to have turned for good. The period from 1995 to 
2015 witnessed successive governments’ endless efforts to tame the endemic localism. The 
straw that broke the camel’s back was the crisis awareness and competitiveness-oriented 
agenda of the centre-right government, which made it increasingly difficult for localist forces 
to lobby for pro-status quo policy. 
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The picture we painted of the case of Finland reveals some critical aspects of the dynamics of 
territorial reform, which, together with similar country cases, contributes to the accumulation 
of knowledge of the political and administrative realities of such reforms, including the 
motivation and impact of localist forces. A future challenge in this respect is to elaborate the 
institutionalist explanatory scheme further so as to better assess the nature of path dependence 
and the emergence of both incremental changes and critical junctures in the reforms as a 
reflection of the given structural and cultural contexts. In such a wider explanatory scheme it 
would be easier to provide a contextual view of the locus of localism. In addition, it is 
increasingly important to learn more about the interplay of exogenous and endogenous factors, 
which through the reform discourses affect social action and evidently also the social 
causation associated with the direction and outcomes of territorial reforms. 
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